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the Hawks rule and a true procedural default rule such as in Slayton. It
stated:
Slayton is a valid procedural default rule... Hawks, however,
is not a true procedural default rule; rather, it is more in the
nature of a collateral estoppel rule. Hawks cannot prevent
federal habeas review of federal constitutional claims properly
raised on direct appeal.... Thus, we must ascertain whether
Turner raised on direct appeal the aforementioned challenges
to the application of the vileness factor. If he did, he is not
procedurally barred from raising them here.49
According to the observation by the court of appeals in its footnote,
that Smith's federal claims were raised and rejected on the merits by the
Virginia Supreme Court on direct appeal, it follows that the district court
was notprevented from reviewing Smith's federal constitutional claims.
Thus, while the court of appeals' conclusion that Smith's state habeas
49 Turner, 35 F.3d at 890 (citing Ylstv. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,
803-07 (1991)).
counsel's errors could never constitute cause is correct, that conclusion
is as irrelevant as Slayton is to this case. As Turner makes clear, Mr.
Smith's federal constitutional claims cannotbe defaultedbyhis counsel's
failure to include them in his state habeas petition because those claims
had already been raised and rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court on
direct appeal.
It is difficult to decide what to recommend to habeas counsel in light
of the court's holding. On the one hand, the law does not require habeas
counsel, absent changed circumstances, to raise the same federal consti-
tutional claims in state habeas that were raised and rejected on the merits
on direct appeal in order to preserve them for federal habeas review. On
the other hand, if a federal court does not understand that such claims do
not need to be raised on state habeas to be preserved it might mistakenly
find those claims to be procedurally defaulted for that very reason. In the
Fourth Circuit it is always best to be overly cautious and prepared to
explain to the court the crucial distinction between Slayton and Hawks.
Summary and analysis by:
Tommy Barrett
BECK v. COMMONWEALTH
253 Va. 373,484 S.E.2d 898 (1997)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Before the court, sitting without a jury, Christopher Beck pleaded
guilty to: (1) capital murder of his cousin Florence Marie Marks during
or subsequent to rape or in the commission of robbery while armed with
a deadly weapon; (2) capital murder of William Miller in the commission
of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon; (3) capital murder of
David Stuart Kaplan in the commission of robbery while armed with a
deadly weapon; (4) statutory burglary; (5) rape; (6) three offenses of
robbery; and (7) seven offenses of the use of a firearm.1
The facts surrounding the murders are mainly drawn from state-
ments Beck made to the police after his arrest.2 According to Beck, he
1 Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 376, 484 S.E.2d 898, 900
(1997).
2 When the Arlington Police first interviewed Beck, he claimed that
at the time of the murders he was transporting bikes from Tennessee.
After a friend failed to corroborate Beck's story, Beck confessed to the
police that he had committed the three murders. Upon returning to
Arlington after his arrest, Beck gave a full statement to the police. While
making his statement, the police gave Beck an opportunity to say
something on his behalf. He said:
That ah Iknow what is like to kill somebody, its one of the
worst feelings you can live with that I don't know that it
is pretty painful that is one of the things that you can't go
to sleep and I'm so sorry that I did, I'm so sorry thatI had
all that anger built up, I should had went to a counselor or
something could have prevented it. I don't know, I'm
sorry but I know this is going to be pretty hard for people
to believe what happened. Id. at 378,484 S.E.2d 901-02.
devised a plan to kill Miller, his former employer, several days before the
murders actually occurred.3 On June 5, 1995, Beck took a bus from his
home in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to Washington, D.C. The next day,
at approximately 11 a.m., Beck arrived in Arlington and went to the
house shared by the three victims. He broke into the house through a
basement window.4
After knocking a hole through to the first floor of the house, Beck
went to Miller's apartment and took a loaded .22 caliber semi-automatic
pistolbelongingto Miller. Beckloaded a sparemagazinefortheweapon,
and returned to the basement to wait for Miller.5
Sometime during the afternoon, Beck heard noises and realized
someone was coming into the basement. He raised the pistol, and as the
door opened, he closed his eyes and fired two shots. Upon opening his
eyes, Beck found his first victim, Florence Marks, lying on the basement
floor. According to Beck, he tried to make it look like Marks had been
raped by cutting off her clothes, stabbing her in the right buttock,
throwing a condom he had found in the washer onto the floor, kicking her,
and penetrating her vagina with a hammer.6 Beck reasoned that if the
police believed Marks had been raped, then they would think a stranger,
and not a family member, had murdered her.
3 Beck, 253 Va. at 376, 484 S.E.2d at 901.
4 1d. at 376-77, 484 S.E.2d at 901.
5 Id. at 377, 484 S.E.2d at 901.
6 Id. According to the testimony of the assistant chief medical
examiner, Marks' autopsy confirmed everything Beck said in his state-
ment except Beck's remark regarding the "staged" rape. The Common-
wealth presented evidence from the used condom found in the house,
asserting that genetic material of both Marks and Beck was found in the
condom. Id. at 378-79, 484 S.E.2d at 902.
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Approximately an hour later, Miller returned home, and as he
ascended the stairs, Beck shot him in the face. As Miller fell down the
stairs, Beck shot five rounds at him.7 He then placed Miller's body in
Kaplan's apartment. 8 Later, Kaplan came home to find Miller's body in
his apartment and Beck with a gun. Beck shot Kaplan in the back of the
head and fired six rounds into him. Still conscious, Kaplan finally
appeared to die after Beck stabbed him in the head.9
After the murders, Beck removed several guns and two bicycles
from the house, and cash from the victims. Beck then changed his clothes
and took Miller's car, driving to Washington, D.C. After making his way
home to Pennsylvania, Beck hid the stolen goods, cleaned the car, and
then abandoned the vehicle. 10
The Commonwealth charged Beck with multiple offenses includ-
ing capital murder, burglary, rape, robbery and use of a firearm in the
commission of these offenses. 11 Beck's motion to suppress all of the
statements made to thepolice was denied after ahearing. 12 Likewise, the
trial court denied Beck's motion challenging the constitutionality of
Virginia's capital murder statute and the statutes establishing trial and
appellate procedure for capital cases.
The trial court accepted Beck's guilty pleas. During a delay
between the pleas and sentencing, the trial judge was inundated with
letters from family members and friends of the victims. The letters
addressed the impact of the crimes on the family members and friends of
the victims. Some recommended that Beck receive the death penalty. 
13
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Beck to death
for each of the three murders14 based upon findings of both "vileness"
7 Beck, 253 Va. at 377,484 S.E.2d at 901. Miller's autopsy report
showed several bruises and abrasions and several gunshot wounds to the
face. The examiner concluded that one of the bullets would have caused
death almost instantaneously. Id. at 379, 484 S.E.2d 902.
8 d. In his statement, Becksaidthat he putMiller's bodyin the other
apartment because "I got sick and tired of looking" at it. Id. at 377, 484
S.E.2d at 901.
9Id. at 377-78, 484 S.E.2d at 901. Although the medical examiner
was unable to determine the order in which the gunshot wounds to Kaplan
were inflicted, she did conclude that only two of the seven wounds would
have been immediately fatal. Id. at 379, 484 S.E.2d at 902.
10 Id. at 378, 484 S.E.2d at 901.
11 Beck, 253 Va. at 375,484 S.E.2d at 900.
12 1d. Beck did not assign error to the trial court's denial of his
motion. Id. at 375, 484 S.E.2d at 900.
13 Id. at 376, 484 S.E.2d at 900.
14 At sentencing, the trial court reviewed evidence of Beck's prior
criminal history. At the age of fourteen, Beck was charged with
aggravated assault after he shoved one of his high school teachers. The
teacher, Joyce Leff, stated that Beck was "hostile towards authority," and
had threatened her to the point of fear. Additionally, Leff testified that
Beck was in special education, and that she found him to be, "emotionally
disturbed... [v]ery hostile, full of rage and anger." In 1991, Beck was
committed to the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare for threatening to
harm his former girlfriend and her parents. While incarcerated and
awaiting the current trial, Beck replaced an inmate's mouthwash with
disinfectant and hit another inmate. The court examined a document
written by Beck in which he included the phrase: "I'm sorry but I love
killing." Id. at 379, 484 S.E.2d at 902.
The court also heard testimony from a clinical psychologist
who hadexaminedBeck. The psychologist found thatBeck was learning
disabled, suffering from attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder, and
antisocial personality disorder. Another clinical psychologist who
examinedBeck believed that Beck's pathology was a result of neglect by
his mother. Additionally, the second psychologist concluded that Beck




The Supreme Court of Virginia held that (1) since the admissibility
of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital
murder trial is limited only by the relevance of such evidence to show the
impact of the defendant's actions, 16 victim impact evidence from per-
sons other than family members of the victims is admissible; 
17 (2) with
regard to the victim impact evidence, the record supported a finding that
the trial judge separated the permissible evidence from any potentially
prejudicial evidence and did not abuse his discretion; 18 (3) the evidence
supported thetrial court's findings offuture dangerousness andvileness;
19
and (4) Beck's death sentences were neither excessive nor disproportion-
ate to penalties generally imposed by other sentencing bodies in the
Commonwealth for comparable crimes.20
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Effect of Beck's Guilty Plea
The most striking effect of Beck's guilty plea, and consequently the
greatest lesson to be -learned, is that in so doing, he surrendered his
sentencing hearing to the trial judge (as opposed to ajury). Since almost
all of the decisions made during the sentencing hearing were later
characterized by the Supreme Court of Virginia as within the discretion
of the trial judge,21 those decisions were subject to the stringent abuse of
discretion standard on appeal.
Furthermore, the court gave great deference to the trial judge
regarding the admissibility of victim impact evidence. Given the judge's
training and experience, the court presumed the judge's ability to
separate the permissible victim impact evidence from any potentially
prejudicial statements. 22 This presumption, coupled with the applica-
tion of the abuse of discretion standard, made it virtually impossible for
Beck to succeed on his victim impact claim on appeal. Beck's ill-fated
appeal is a lesson in capital defense, in that it reinforces the idea that
pleading guilty to a capital offense is rarely if ever opportune.
II. Victim Impact Evidence: Where It Stands After Beck
A. Constitutional Admissibility
In claiming that it was improper for the trial court to receive victim
impact evidence from persons not related to the victims, 23 Beck asserted
Id. at 380, 484 S.E.2d at 902-03.
15 The opinion is another example of a court in Virginia ignoring the
individuality of the defendant and determining vileness and future
dangerousness in its boilerplate one paragraph analysis. The courts
arbitrarily void these claims deeming the evidence as "sufficient" with-
out ever discussing contentions that the aggravators are vague. Id. at 387,
484 S.E.2d 906-07.
16ld. at 381,484 S.E.2d at 904.
17 Beck, 253 Va. at 384, 484 S.E.2d at 905.
18 Id. at 386, 484 S.E.2d at 906.
19 Id. at 387, 484 S.E.2d at 906-07.
20 Id. at 388,484 S.E.2d at 907. In reaching this part of the holding,
the court conducted its mandatory "proportionality review." Va. Code
§ 17-110.1(C) (1996). While the review is mandated by statute, there is
wide speculation on how such a review is actually conducted.
21 Beck, 253 Va. at 385, 484 S.E.2d at 906.
22 1d. at 386, 484 S.E.2d at 906.
23 In addition to letters from family members of the victims, the trial
court reviewed letters from co-workers and friends of the victims, letters
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that such evidence was constitutionally barred because it exceeded the
scope of victim impact evidence allowed in Payne v. Tennessee.24 Beck
argued that Payne was only intended to apply to family members based
on the following language: "[a] State may legitimately conclude that the
evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the
victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the
death penalty should be imposed." 25
The Supreme Court of Virginia squarely rejected Beck's argu-
ment,2 6 finding that such a limitation was neither implied nor expressed
by the language in Payne. Rather, the Court reasoned, Payne was
describing the nature and not the source of the evidence.27 Moreover,
citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Payne, the court stated that the
impact of the loss of the victim of a murder may extend beyond the
victim's family members to the victim's friends and community.
28
For example, in Payne, the Court made no mention of whether such
victim impact evidence was limited to family members of the victim or
if it extended to non-family members.29 Rather, victim impact evidence
is admissible under Payne unless it is so prejudicial as to violate the Due
Process Clause.30 Therefore, while one cannot conclusively state that
the Supreme Court of Virginia stretched the limits of Payne in allowing
non-family victim impact testimony, such testimony should be objected
to on the basis that Payne authorized the admission of family victim
impact evidence, and did not sanction admitting evidence from those
outside of the victim's family.
B. Relevance Standard
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Beck's constitutional
argument concerning non-family victim impact evidence. In the altema-
tive, the court held that the admissibility of victim impact evidence
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial is limited only by
the relevance of such evidence to show the impact of the defendant's
actions.3 1 Therefore, the sole standard for judging the admissibility of
victim impact evidence is "relevance." Given the broadness of "rel-
evance," it is difficult to imagine what testimony the Supreme Court of
Virginia envisioned could be ruled inadmissible.
sent to Kaplan's parents, news accounts and essays written by co-
workers of Kaplan. Some of these letters included the authors' opinions
whether Beck shouldreceive the death sentence or life imprisonment. Id.
at 380, 484 S.E.2d at 903.
24 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that victim impact evidence is
admissible at sentencing phase of capital trial so long as it does notviolate
fundamental fairness protected by due process clause).
25Beck, 253 Va. at381,484 S.E.2d at 903 (quotingPayne, 501 U.S.
at 827).
26 Prior to the sentencing hearing, Beck asked the trial court not to
consider non-family victim impact evidence. The trial court stated that
it would review all the documents, determining admissibility based upon
the closeness of the relationship between the victim and the witness. Id.
at 380, 484 S.E.2d at 903. This "closeness of the relationship" standard
seems to be particularly broad, adding more weight to the discretion of
the trial court.
27 Id. at 381,484 S.E.2d at 903.
281d.
29 It should be noted, however, that the evidence upon which the
Supreme Court made its decision in Payne was testimony from Mary
Zvolanek, the mother and grandmother of the two victims. Payne, 501
U.S. at 814.
30 .Levy, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument After
Payne v. Tennessee, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1060 (1993).
31 Beck, 253 Va. at 381,484 S.E.2d at 904.
However, there is a possible argument to combat the broadness of
the court's relevance standard. The court notes the use of a balancing test
to determine the admissibility of victim impact evidence, stating, "[a]
judge, unlike a juror, is uniquely suited by training, experience and
judicial discipline to disregard potentially prejudicial comments and to
separate, during the mental process of adjudication, the admissible from
the inadmissible, even though he has heard both."'32 Based on this
limitation, capital defense counsel can suggest that Federal Rule of
Evidence40333 be used as amodelfor admitting victim impactevidence,
in that it precludes the use of evidence when its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value.
34
C. Statutory Admissibility
Beck contended that even if not constitutionally barred, "the crimi-
nal procedure provisions within Title 19.2 of the Virginia Code limit
victim impact evidence in a capital murder case to that received from the
victim's family members.' 35 Relying upon Virginia Code Sections
19.2-11.01,36 19.2- 264.5, 7 and 19.2-299.1,3 8 Beck argued that these
321d. at 385,484 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Eckhart v. Commonwealth,
222 Va. 213, 216, 279 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1981)).
33 Fed. R. Evid. 403. FRE 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
34 Levy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 1038.
35 Beck, 253 Va. at 382, 484 S.E.2d at 904.
36 Under Section 19.2-11.01, titled "Crime victim and witness
rights," the Code provides:
A. Inrecognition of the Commonwealth's concernfor the
victims and witnesses of crime, it is the purpose of this chapter to
ensure that the full impact of crime is brought to the attention of the
courts of the Commonwealth;...
4. Victim input.
a. Victims shall be given the opportunity, pursuant to §§
19.2-299.1, to prepare a written victim impact statement prior to
sentencing of a defendant and may provide information to any
individual or agency chargedwith investigating the social history of
a person or preparing a victim impact statement under the provi-
sions of §§ 16.1-273 and 53.1-155 or any other applicable law....
B. For purposes of this chapter, "victim" eans... (iv)
a spouse, parent or legal guardian of such a person who.., was the
victim of a homicide.
37 Under Section 19.2-264.5, titled "Post-sentence reports," the
Code provides:
When the punishment of any person has been fixed at
death, the court shall, before imposing sentence, direct a
probation officer of the court to thoroughly investigate
the history of the defendant and any and all other relevant
facts, to the end that the court may be fully advised as to
whether the sentence of death is appropriate and just.
Reports shall be made, presented and filed as provided in
§ 19.2-299 except that, notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, such reports shall in all cases contain a Victim
Impact Statement. Such statement shall contain the same
information and be prepared in the same manner as
Victim Impact Statements prepared pursuant to § 19.2-
299.1. After consideration of the report, and upon good
cause shown, the court may set aside the sentence of death
and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.
38 Under Section 19.2-299.1, titled "When Victim Impact State-
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three statutes, when read together, allow only for gathering and presen-
tation of evidence from those persons determined to be "victims" under
the Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act (hereinafter "the Act"). 39 In
reading these statutes in concert, Beck asserted that in limiting the
definition of "victim"in the Act to members of the deceased's family, the
legislature implicitly intended to limit admissible victim impact evi-
dence to that submitted by persons under Code Sections 19.2-264.5 and
19.2-299.1.4
0
The court found no merit to this argument, determining that nothing
within the Act limited the source of victim impact evidence.4 1 Addition-
ally, the court reasoned that sections 19.2-299.1 simply defined whose
consent the Commonwealth had to acquire in order to submit the victim
impact statement in the sentencing report. The court concluded that
nothing in the cited code provisions limited the sources of the victim
impact statements and found instead that the presentence report could
include anything the trial court "may require related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim."42 Unfortunately, the court did not stop there,
but went on to determine that "the circumstances of the individual case
will dictate what evidence will be necessary and relevant, and from what
sources it may be drawn. ' 43 Again, the court is establishing a standard,
couched in broad, ambiguous language. At some point, such a standard
becomes counterproductive, sweeping so much that the standard elimi-
nates itself.
Despite the court's rejection, the statutory argument devised by
Beck's counsel is clever and worthy of future pursuit. To strengthen the
argument, capital defense counsel should investigate its legislative
ment required; contents; uses.," the Code provides:
The presentence report prepared pursuant to § 19.2-299 shall,
with the consent of the victim, as defined in § 19.2-11.01, in all cases
involving offenses other than capital murder, include a Victim Impact
Statement. Victim Impact Statements in all cases involving capital
murder shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with the provi-
sions of § 19.2-264.5.
A Victim Impact Statement shall be kept confidential and shall be
sealed upon entry of the sentencing order. If prepared by someone other
than the victim, it shall... (vi) provide such other information as the court
may require related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.
39 Va. Code §§ 19.2-11.01 to -11.4 (1996).
40 Beck, 253 Va. at 384,484 S.E.2d at 905.
41 1d. at 384, 484 S.E.2d at 905.
42 Id.
43 Id. Again, the court leaves such a determination within the sound
discretion of the trial court subject only to an abuse of discretion standard
on appeal. Id. at 384-85, 484 S.E.2d at 905.
history, to ascertain, if possible, the Act's legislative intent. Further-
more, counsel could argue the principles of in pari materia (statutes
within the same Act should be construed consistently) and strict con-
struction of criminal statutes.
m. The Twists within Beck
In spite of the fact that on the surface this seems to be another
dismaying death penalty opinion handed down by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, some careful "scratching" reveals quite a different conclusion.
The first point of light within the darkness is that a capital defendant with
ajury sentencing hearing may not be subject to the relevance standard of
admissibility of victim impact evidence outlined in Beck. The court's
heavy reliance upon the sound discretion of the trial judge in separating
relevant from prejudicial victim impact evidence is not applicable to jury
sentencing.44 The unique training and experience of the trial judge
which the court assures creates presumptions of fairness and impartiality
is not present with jurors. Consequently, it can be argued that the broad
relevance standard employed in Beck applies only to the trained judicial
sentencer.
The second twist in Beck concerns the letters from family and non-
family members of the victims which contained recommendations that
Beck be sentenced to death, and which were reviewed by the trial judge
as victim impact evidence.45 Based on the record, the court found that
the trial judge separated the permissible victim impact evidence from any
potentially prejudicial statements concerning sentencing and only con-
sidered the former.46 Arguably then, the inference can be drawn that the
judge in his sound discretion must have decided that these recommenda-
tions for death should not be considered. Using this argument, capital
defense counsel can attempt to keep out similar victim impact evidence
which recommends the death penalty.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
44 The court itself, in reviewing the admissibility and consideration
of the victim impact evidence received by the trial court, "[stressed] that
this was a trial without a jury." Beck 253 Va. at 385,484 S.E.2d at 905.
45 The court maintained that it does not necessarily agree with
Beck's characterization of these letters as "recommendations" or that the
trial judge took them as such. Instead, the court views the statements as
expressions of the depth of the authors' feelings concerning the impact
of these crimes. Id. at 386 n.2, 484 S.E.2d at 906 n.2.
46 Beck, 253 Va. at 386, 484 S.E.2d at 906.
WILLIAMS v. WARDEN
487 S.E.2d 194 (Va. 1997)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
In November 1985, Terry Williams robbed and murdered Harris
Thomas Stone. Williams struck Stone, an elderly man, on the chest and
back with a mattock and removed three dollars from Stone's wallet. The
blows from the mattock fractured several of Stone's ribs, punctured his
left lung, and caused internal bleeding which ultimately led to Stone's
death. Williams confessed to the murder and robbery on several
occasions. 1 In September 1986, Williams was convicted of capital
murder while in the commission of armed robbery pursuant to Virginia
Code Section 18.2-31(d).
2
1 Williams v. Warden, 487 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1997).
2This section has since been changedto Virginia Code Section 18.2-
31(4).
